From TIME’s analysis of the awful events in Pakistan and their implications …

But there are some who think the Bush Administration is not without blame. Hussain Haqqani, a former top aide to Bhutto and now a professor at Boston University, thinks the U.S., which has counted Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf as a key ally against terrorism since 9/11, bears some of the responsibility. “Washington will have to answer a lot of questions, especially the Administration,” he says. “People like me have been making specific requests to American officials to intervene and ask for particular security arrangements be made for her, and they have been constantly just trusting the Musharraf Administration.” U.S. officials said they were leery of intervening in another nation’s internal affairs, and didn’t want to give Bhutto Washington’s imprimatur. …
The U.S. has few options in Pakistan. One thing is clear, says Peter Galbraith, senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: It is “not a good idea to have 70 nuclear weapons in the hands of a country that is falling apart.” Some observers believe that U.S. policy in Pakistan has favored personalities over principles. “We have a bad habit of always personalizing our foreign policy,” says P.J. Crowley, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. “We’ve done it with Musharraf, and we did it with respect to Bhutto. We are very good at providing technical support to the Pakistani army. We are not good at building indigenous or effective local political processes or strong institutions of government.” Given the realities on the ground, the U.S. is likely to continue to throw its support behind Musharraf. “In terms of political leadership, Pakistan does not have a deep bench,” says Crowley.